Self-Worth and Moral Knowledge :: Philosophy Morals Traditions Papers

Self-Worth and Moral KnowledgeI argue that someones are unlikely to befool lesson friendship heretofore as they lack certain lesson justices that persons are commonly inferior in these virtues, and hence that they are on a regular basis unlikely to have fitted moral knowledge. I propose a version of this purpose that employs a broad conception of self-worth, a virtue found in a wide range of moral traditions that pronounce a person would have an appropriate sense of self-worth in the panorama of tendencies both to overappraisal and underestimate the value of ones self. I begin by noting some typical features of this logical argument that distinguish it from more(prenominal) common arguments for moral skepticism. This is followed by an elucidation of the virtue of self-worth. I then(prenominal) consider some connections amid self-worth and moral knowledge and, more briefly, the conclusion of self-worth among persons. Finally, I oppose to the objection that the argu ment is incoherent because it presupposes moral knowledge that it later undermines.My aim is to offer a brief defense of an argument for a moderate moral skepticism that is rooted in righteousness itself as often understood. In general form, the argument is based on the contention that persons are unlikely to have moral knowledge insofar as they lack certain moral virtues it continues with the claim that persons are commonly deficient in these virtues, and it concludes that they are regularly unlikely to have adequate moral knowledge. I will propose a version of this argument that employs a broad conception of self-worth, a virtue found in a wide range of moral traditions that suppose a person should have an appropriate sense of self-worth in the face of tendencies both to overestimate and underestimate the value of ones self.I begin by noting some distinctive features of this argument that distinguish it from more common arguments for moral skepticism (section I). This is followed by an elucidation of the virtue of self-worth (section II). I then consider some connections between self-worth and moral knowledge (sections III and IV), and, more briefly, the extent of self-worth among persons (section V). Finally, I respond to an objection that may be made against this argument (section VI).I.The argument I defend here is in several respects different than acquainted(predicate) arguments for moral skepticism. First, moral skeptics often purport to show that there is no moral knowledge and sometimes that there can be none. (1) The bribe argument claims only that persons commonly are likely to be deficient in moral knowledge and hence that there is less moral knowledge among persons than might be thought.